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FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND
APPLICATION OF THE "SEPARABILITY
DOCTRINE" IN FEDERAL COURTS
The classification of arbitration as "substantive" in Bernhardt v. Poly-
graphic Company jeopardized application of the federal Arbitration
Act in diversity cases. However, in the recent case of Prima Paint
Corporation v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Company, the Su-
preme Court found the Act to be a legitimate exercise of the federal
commerce power and, hence, applicable in diversity cases involving
arbitration agreements contained in interstate contracts. Furthermore,
in interpreting the Act, the Court ruled that an arbitration provision
is severable from other portions of an agreement for purposes of adju-
dicating contractual validity. However, by speaking only of federal
court enforcement of the Act, the Court may have created severe
forum-shopping problems. In order to avoid these problems, and vin-
dicate the policy behind the Act, the coverage of the Act may subse-
quently be extended to the states.
T he Supreme Court's classification of arbitration as "substantive" in na-
ture' jeopardized successful invocation of the federal Arbitration Act2
in cases in which jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. Consist-
ent with that classification, the Erie-Guaranty Trust doctrine3 seemingly
mandated that state law govern judicial treatment of an arbitration
agreement in simple diversity cases. Recently, however, in Prima Paint
Corporation v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Company,4 the Supreme
Court held the Act properly applicable to diversity cases involving contracts
in interstate commerce, refusing to consider referent state contract law.5 In
interpreting the Act, the Court ruled that an arbitration provision is
severable from other portions of an agreement for purposes of adjudicating
contractual validity: issues which go to the enforceability of the entire
contract will be resolved by the arbitrator, while the validity of the
"making" of the arbitration clause itself will be judicially determined. 6
I See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 202-04 (1956); Note, 69
YALE LJ. 847, 848, 864-67 (1960). 4r
29 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964). See notes 21-32 infra and accompanying text.
3 See notes 33-41 infra and accompanying text.
4 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
5 Id. at 404-05. See notes 85-87 infra and accompanying text.
6 388 U.S. at 403-04, 406. See notes 48-51 & 62-67 infra and accompanying text.
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Having concluded, in effect, that the "separability doctrine" was inherent in
the "substantive rules" of the Arbitration Act, the majority found
constitutional warrant for the Act in the congressional power to regulate the
practice of the federal courts in dealing with disputes arising in interstate
commerce.7 However, the Court spoke only of federal court enforcement of
arbitration agreements contained in contracts involving interstate
commerce. 8 Thus, the Act may arguably be subject to an equal protection
attack by those who, because of the jurisdictional requirements of the Act
and the general federal removal statute, cannot gain access to the local
federal court and are, therefore, vulnerable to state court hostility toward
antecedent arbitration agreements. 9 For this reason, and in order to curb
further judicial resistance to arbitration, the Court may eventually extend
the coverage of the Act to the states as a matter of "national substantive
law.o10
Petitioner Prima Paint contracted to purchase the interstate paint
business of respondent Flood & Conklin. To facilitate the change in
ownership, the parties entered into a consulting agreement,1 which included
7388 U.S. at 405. See notes 85-87 infra and accompanying text. The Prima Court
does not expressly adopt the terminology of the Second .Circuit in Robert Lawrence
Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), that arbitration agree-
ments were "separable" from the rest of the contract, id. at 410. However, since the
Supreme Court did reach the same result, the use of the term "separability doc-
trine" would seem justifiable. See note 53 infra. The First Circuit, which refused to up-
hold a federal "separability doctrine," see note 54 infra, noted the possibility of such
a doctrine under the New York Arbitration Act, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §§ 7501-14
(McKinney 1963), which served as the model for the Arbitration Act. Lummus Co.
v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915, 923-27 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 911 (1960).
8 388 U.S. at 403. See notes 89-90 infra and accompanying text.
0 See text following note 89 infra. At the present time, twenty-seven states will not
enforce a written agreement to settle a future dispute by arbitration. A number of juris-
dictions will enforce a present agreement to arbitrate, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 5701-06 (1953); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-201 to -226 (1946); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5-201 to -213 (1963); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 279-97 (1956), or will do so if the
agreement has been submitted in writing to the court, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-101
to -224 (1933); N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-544 to -567 (1951); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 8-503 to -507 (1957). Three states-Alaska, Oklahoma, and Vermont-have no
statutory provisions for commercial arbitration. The legislative enactments in Maine
and New Mexico, on the other hand, provide inadequate substitutes for the procedural
safeguards incorporated in the Arbitration Act for situations arisinW after an arbitration
agreement has been held valid, such as failure to agree on an arbitrator or application
for enforcement of an award. Compare Mn. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 1151-55
(1964), and N. M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3-1 to -8 (1953), with Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§§ 3-13 (1964). See also notes 25-29 infra and accompanying text.
10 See text accompanying notes 90-120 infra.
11 In an affidavit submitted to the District Court for the Southern District of New
York, the president of Prima Paint stated that the consulting agreement was designed to
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a broad arbitration clause encompassing any disputes arising out of "this
Agreement."' 2 When a controversy arose under the consulting arrangement,
Flood & Conklin requested arbitration. 13 Invoking diversity jurisdiction, 14
Prima sought recission of the consulting provision in a federal district court,
alleging fraud in the inducement of that agreement. Flood & Conklin then
moved for a stay of legal proceedings pending arbitration as provided by
section 3 of the Act.15
In granting the motion to stay, the district court found the arbitration
clause sufficiently broad to require arbitral determination of the validity of
the consulting agreement and, relying upon the "separability doctrine," held
that Prima's claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally was
a question for the arbiters, although a specific identical allegation with
respect to the arbitration clause would have required judicial resolution. 16
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied Prima's appeal17 and
the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. While agreeing that the
Arbitration Act mandated application of the principles of separability in the
federal courts, the Supreme Court located the source of those precepts in
section 4 of the Act, rather than in the substantive provisions of section 2.18
effectuate "an orderly transfer of the assets of the defendant [F & C] to the plaintiff
[Prima Paint], and [the agreement] contemplated and intended that the defendant
would consult, advise, assist and help the plaintiff so as to insure a smooth transition of
manufacturing operations .... , together with the sales and servicing of customer ac-
counts and the retention of the said customers." 388 U.S. at 401 n.6. See text following
note 55 infra.
" 388 U.S. at 398. The pertinent portion of the arbitration agreement stated: "Any
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof,
shall be settled by arbitration in the City of New York, in accordance with the rules
then obtaining of the American Arbitration Association...."
Is Id. Prima Paint refused to payp the first installment due under tho purchase agree-
ment, claiming that F & C had fraudulently misrepresented itself as solvent. In fact, a
week after the sales contract had been signed, and before the consulting agreement was
entered into, F & C filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy under Chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-1255 (1964). In a letter to F & C's attorneys, Prima
Paint alleged fraudulent inducement of both contracts. However, in the actual suit for
recision filed by Prima Paint, the complaint referred to fraudulent inducement of the
consulting agreement alone. 388 U.S. at 398-99.
14 Prima Paint was a Maryland corporation, while F & C was incorporated in New
Jersey. 388 U.S. at 397.
15 Id. at 399; Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1964). See note 26 infra.
16 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 262 F. Supp. 605, 606-07
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F. 2d
402, 410 (2d Cir. 1959); text accompanying notes 62-67 infra.
17 360 F.2d 315, 318 (2d Cir. 1966).
Is Compare 388 U.S. at 403-05, with Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,




Moreover, the Court chose not to extend the Act to the states,19 despite.
dictum favoring extension in several earlier circuit court opinions.20
The Arbitration Act divides naturally into two segments. Sections 1 and
2 set forth in broad, substantive terms the congressional desire to quell
traditional judicial hostility to arbitration. 21 Thus, section 2 makes "valid,
10 388 U.S. at 403, 406. See note 90 infra. Justice Harlan would have affirmed on
the basis of Lawrence. Id. at 407 (concurring opinion).
20 See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F. 2d 402, 407 (2d
Cir. 1959); cases cited note 52 infra.21 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1964); COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, To MAKE VALID
AND ENFORCEABLE CERTAiN AGREEMENTS FOR ARBITRATION, S. R P. No. 536, 68th
Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3 (1924); Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law,
The United States Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A.Y. 153, 155 (1925);
Note, Commercial Arbitration in Federal Courts, 20 VAND. L. REV. 607, 608-09 (1967).
The Arbitration Act became law in 1925 at the urging of various business inter-
ests and under the sponsorship of the American Bar Association. Patterned after the
New York Arbitration Act of 1921, it was hoped that the Act would reduce'litigation,
thereby decreasing the delays and expenses incumbent to any formal judicial settling
of disputes, and would permit the use of business expertise in the settlement of essen-
tially technical controversies. See Baum & Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial
Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts (pt.1), 8 N.Y.U.L.Q. 238, 249-50
(1930); Bernheimer, The United States Arbitration Act, 3 DocKET 2928 (1925); note
67 infra. As explained to congressional committees by the American Bar Association,
the Arbitration Act was to be passed in conjunction with uniform state laws on arbi-
tration, thereby removing any problem of differing state and federal law in diversity
cases. See Report of Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, 47 A.B.A.
REP. 288, 294 (1922); Report of Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial
Law, 46 A.B.A. REP. 309, 355 (1921); cf. Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. of
the Comms. on the Judiciary on the Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes,
68th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, vol. 1, at 6, 16, 28 (1924). However, because of a dispute
among members of the American Bar Association, thet task of writing the actual uni-
form state law was referred to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. Report of Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, 50
A.B.A. REP. 353, 359 (1925). See id. at 135-62 for a report of the floor debate at the
American Bar Convention. The uniform law proposed by the Commissioners and 'sub-
sequently passed by six states-Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wiscon-
sin, and Wyoming-was considerably weaker than the Arbitration Act in that the
uniform state law made valid, irrevocable, and enforceable only agreements 'to submit
present controveries to arbitration. See id. at 591. See also Report of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, 49 A.B.A. REP. 45 (1924). In 1943 this uniform law was
abandoned by the Commissioners, compare list of Uniform Acts approved by the Bar
Association, 67 A.B.A. REP. 452 (1942), with same list, 68 A.B.A. REP. 528 (1943),
and was replaced by a statute which is in conformity with the Arbitration Act. Report
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 80 A.B.A. REP. 171 (1955). Presently,
seven states have adopted this second statute. See Arrz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1501
to -1517 (Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 101-23 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 7, §§ 1-23 (Supp. 1967); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 251, §§ 1-19
(Supp. 1966); MINN. STAT. ANi. §§572.08-.30 (Supp. 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§§ 161-181 (1963); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1048.1-.21 (Supp. 1967).
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irrevocable, and enforceable" all written arbitration agreements contained
in maritime transactions or contracts involving commerce, with the
exception of situations where grounds "exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."22 However, section 1 restricts the scope of the
Act to interstate arbitration agreements by defining "commerce" as
"commerce among the several States or with foreign nations. '23
Accordingly, these "enabling" sections appear to be an exercise of the
commerce power.24 Sections 3 through 13 constitute the "procedural" de-
vices for implementing the mandate of section 2.25 Section 3 authorizes any
federal court to stay trial of an action pending arbitration, while section 4
grants district courts power to compel arbitration if there is a valid
arbitration agreement.26 Further, the latter provision directs the courts to
adjudicate a claim, rather than defer to the arbitrators, "[i] f the making of
229 U.S.C. § 2 (1964): "A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a contro-
versy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing tol submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract."
'ld. § 1. Section 1 provides in part: "'[Cjommerce,' as herein defined, means
commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, ... but nothing herein
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
24 See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406-07
(2d Cir. 1959); H. R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1924); Joint Hearings,
supra note 21, at 7; Sturges & Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitra-
tion Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PnoB. 580, 585-98
(1952). But see Note, 46 TXAs L. Rnv. 260, 262-65 (1967).
5 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-13 (1964).
26 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1964): "If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts
of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in
writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satis-
fled that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under
such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial, of the action
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, pro-
viding the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration."
Section 4 provides in part:' "A party aggrieved [by a violation of section 2] may
petition any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have
jurisdiction under Title 28, . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in
the manner provided for in such agreement. '. . The court shall hear the parties, and
upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to
comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to
proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.... If the making
of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in
issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof... ." 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
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the arbitration agreement" is in question.27 The subsequent sections of the
Act provide for the successful completion of arbitration and enforcement of
an award, limiting judicial modification or reversal to instances of obvious
fraud, corruption, prejudice, or mistake on the part of the arbitrator.
27 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1964) (emphasis added). Section 4 also directs the courts to
adjudicate a claim if "the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform" the arbitration agree-
ment is in issue. While this could be construed to permit the avoidance of arbitration by
a party's mere refusal to comply with the agreement, such anlinterpretation would tend
to subvert the purpose of the Act. Therefore, this provision might be read as allowing
judicial determination only when the failure 'to perform is due to a dispute concerning
the making of the arbitration agreement. But see Baum & Pressman, supra note 21,
at 252.
289 U.S.C. §§ 5-13 (1964). Section 5 grants a federal court power to appoint an
arbitrator if the parties should fail to agree, or if no provision was included in the
agreement for an appointment. Section 7 conveys the subpoena power to the arbitrator,
whether the arbitrator be appointed by the court or selected by the parties. Section 9 pro-
vides for the enforcement of arbitration awards, and, apparently, a party to an award
may file an application for federal court enforcement without meeting the normal juris-
dictional requirements, see notes 94-96 infra and accompanying text, so long as the
award was rendered within that court's district. However, there would seem to be no
rational basis for permitting freer access to a federal remedy 'where an award has been
made (§ 9) than where arbitration has not yet taken place (§ 4), since the statute at-
tempts to validate all arbitration agreements within the confines of the Act (§ 2), rather
than merely those agreements which have attained award status.
Section 10 provides for vacation of an award: "(a) Where . . . procured by cor-
ruption, fraud, or undue means. (b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption
in the arbitrators .... (c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refus-
ing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evi-
dence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by 'which
the rights of any party have been prejudiced. (d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers.. . ." Section 11 gives a district court power to modify or correct an award:
"(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation.. . or an evident material
mistake . . .. (b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted
to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision .... "
The various state statutes similarly limit the scope of judicial review of an arbi-
trator's award, primarily in order to prevent the undue delay and expense which arbi-
tration is designed to avoid. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 842 (1960); MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 251, § 12 (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 435.100, 435.110 (1949);
WAsH. REV. CODE § 7.04.160, 7.04.170 (Supp. 1956). See also W. STURGEs, COM-
MERCIAL ARITBhAONS AND AwAPDs § 360-70 (1930); Cohen & Dayton, The New
Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REv. 265, 273 (1926).
Such restricted judicial review may lead to undesirable consequences, as indicated
by a recent Second Circuit opinion, Standard Chlorine, Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304
(2d Cir. 1967). After the plaintiff had brought an action in a district court for breach
of contract, fraud, and recision, the defendant moved for a stay of the legal proceedings
pending arbitration. The district court granted the motion, and the Second Circuit dis-
missed the appeal. The circuit court noted that a section 3 stay order under the Arbitra-
tion Act was not a "final decision' within 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964). Hence, the plain-
tiff could only prevail if the stay order fell within one of the exceptions to the finality
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Recourse to these remedies, however, is dependent upon the satisfaction of
traditional jurisdictional prerequisites for entry into the federal courts.29
Congressional discussion of the Act's constitutional foundation centered
upon the power given Congress in article III to regulate procedure in the
federal courts.30 Had the statute been solely an exercise of that power,
however, there would have been no need to limit its provisions to arbi-
tration 'agreements in interstate contracts.3' Consequently, the bifurcated
composition of the Act suggests that it rests on dual constitutional grounds,
the article M power and the commerce clause. 32
requirement contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1964), which provides that "Inter-
locutory orders. . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions
..." are appealable. The court felt bound by the Supreme Court decision in Balti-
more Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955), which indicated that an
order staying a suit pending arbitration was an interlocutory injunction under § 1292,
and thus appealable, only if the stay sought was of a "law type action." 384 F.2d at
307. The stay of an "equity type proceeding" was to be considered an order within
the legal action, and thus not appealable. Id. Characterizing, the plaintiff's complaint as
equitable, the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal. Thus, due to the strict confines of
judicial review under the Arbitration Act and the numerous comparable state statutes,
a party asserting merely an equitable attack upon a contract containing an enforceable
arbitration agreement will obtain judicial treatment of that claim only if he is able to
demonstrate corruption or obvious mistake on the part of the arbitrator. Since the arbi-
trator will be determining "legal" as well as "commercial" questions, the lack of any
effective judicial review in this instance would seem highly questionable and, perhaps,
an unconstitutional denial of due process. Prima Paint Corp. v.'Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). See notes 60 & 67 infra.
29 See notes 92-94 infra and accompanying text.
30 388 U.S. at 418-20 & nn.18-23 (Black, L, dissenting); see Joint Hearings, supra
note 21, at 17-18, 37; cf. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924); Com-
mittee on Commerce, supra note 21, at 154-55. But see 388 U.S. at 401-02 n.7, 405-06
n.13.
319 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1964); see Sturges & Murphy, supra note 24, at 589; Note, 69
YALE LJ. 847, 858 (1960).32 Committee on Commerce, supra note 21, at 154-55; note, 108 U. PA. L. REv.
915, 916, 918-19 (1960). See notes 21-28 supra and accompanying text. The limited
documentary evidence available suggests that Congress was not in agreement as to the
constitutional grounds for the Act. For example, in the House report, the purpose of
the bill was stated to be "to make valid and enforcible agreements for arbitration 'con-
tained in contracts involving interstate commerce' .... " On the same page, however,
there appears the comment that "[wJhether an agreement for arbitration shall be en-
forced or not is a question of procedure ... ." H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1924). Lobbyists for the Act appeared to have a more definite conception of
the legislation's constitutional basis:- "[The Act] rests upon the constitutional provi-
sions by which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior federal courts."
Joint Hearings, supra note 21, at 37. Contra, Committee on Commerce, supra note
21, at 154-55. Congressional confusion may have been induced by the fact that arbi-
tration was considered by the Supreme Court to be a "remedy," rather than purely a
procedural device. See Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 277-79 (1932);
Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1924); Sturges & Murphy,
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In Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkin 33 the Supreme Court held that,
absent a preemptive federal statute, state statutory and decisional law must
govern federal diversity cases. 34 The Court indicated that defendants unable
to remove to the federal system to contest a state substantive right were
denied equal protection of the laws, since they were subject to varying
judicial interpretations of the state claim depending upon whether a state or
federal forum was selected by their adversary as most favorable to the
latter's cause of action.35 To neutralize the adversary's advantage, the
supra note 24, at 590-93. Labeling arbitration as remedial suggested that the Act pos-
sessed significant substantive characteristics. A court might find that arbitration was
"substance" and not "procedure," thus invalidating the Act as an exercise of the article
I regulatory power. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956);
notes 42-46 infra and accompanying text. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that
the "procedural" classification was used to gloss over judicial antagonism toward arbi-
tration. Heilman, Arbitration Agreements and the Conflect of Laws, 38 YALE L. 617,
648-49 (1929). See notes 9 & 21 supra and accompanying text. While the Act could
easily bej justified today as an exercise of the commerce power, as was done in Prima,
388 U.S. at 405, the 68th Congress apparently did not wish to rest the Act on this
constitutional basis alone. This reticence is understandable since, at that time, legislative
power under;the commerce clause was still ill-defined. Compare Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936), and Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
34 Id. at 78. Prior to Erie the federal uniformity concept of Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), was controlling. In interpreting the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964)), Swift had required
the federal courts, in the absence of applicable federal statutes, to adhere to state statu-
tory but not state decisional law. Thus, the federal courts were to loold to federal prece-
dent and the "federal common law" when litigating a state-created cause of action. See
note 35 infra. For modem references to "federal common law" see notes 54 and 113
infra.
35 304 U.S. at 74-77. Erie actually raised three constitutional grounds for over-
ruling Swift v. Tyson. See note 34 supra. In addition to denial of equal protection, the
Swift rule was thought to be contrary to: (1) the separation of power within the fed-
eral government in that it ascribed a legislative function to the judiciary in violation of
article I of the Constitution; and (2) the separation of federal-state power as dictated
by the tenth amendment. 304 U.S. at 74-80. Erie has served as the focal point for a
plethora of commentary. See, e.g., Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brood-
ing Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L. J. 267 (1946); Friendly, In Praise
of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 383 (1964); Hart,
The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489 (1954); Hill,
The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427 (1958); Jackson,
"The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson," 24 A.B.A.J. 609 (1938); Keeffe, Gilhooley,
Bailey & Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494 (1949); Kochery, The Enforcement
of Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts: Erie v. Tompkins, 39 CORNELL L.Q.
74 (1953); Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doc-
trine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.. 187 (1957); Stason, Choice of Law Within the
Vol. 1968: 5881
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
majority instated the law of the forum as supreme in matters of
"procedure," and. the law of the state as preeminent in matters of
'substance." 36 In attempting to unravel the protean substance-procedure
dichot6miy of Erie, the Supreme Court in Guaranty Trust Company v.
York37 extrapolated a mechanical "outcome-determinative'l test.3 8 The
Guaranty Court encouraged the judiciary to ignore the state or federal
policy being fostered by the granting or withholding of a procedural remedy,
in order to assure that the outcome of the dispute be identical in either
judicial system.39 Thus, in attempting to make the local federal court "only
another court of the State" in diversity cases, a federal procedure was to be
deemed "subsiantive" for purposes of Erie if it substantially affected the
outcome of the state-created claim.40 Since numerous states were opposed
to arbitration,41 invocation of the "outcome-determinative" standard
seemingly precluded enforcement of the Arbitration Act in a federal
diversity case.
This assumption was borne out in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company Of
America.42 In Bernhardt the Supreme Court held that the "procedural"
Federal System: Erie Versus Hanna, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 377 (1967). See generally 2
W.' CROSSKEY, POLTICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 912-20 (1953); J. MOORE, COMmENTARY ON THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL
CODE 315-59 (1949); C. WiGorr, FEDERAL COURTS §§ 54-60 (1963).
3 304 U.S. at 78 (by implication); see C. WIuor, supra note 35, §§ 54-60; Clark,
supra note 35; cf. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1947).
3 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
38 Id. at 109. Subsequent decisions have abandoned the Guaranty Trust test where
special circumstances warranted. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc.,
356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958), the Supreme Court refused to apply a state workmen's com-
pensation act in a diversity case, asserting that the "outcome" test was inapplicable
where it led to the nullification of a basic federal right such as trial by jury. J5ee
Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L.
R v. 711 (1950); Stason, supra note 35, at 392-94. Similarly, in Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 473 (1965), the Supreme Court held that the Guaranty Trust test did not
apply where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were in conflict with a state policy.
See Stason, supra note 35, at 398-404; Comment, Hanna v. Plumer: An Expanded Con-
cept of Federal Common Law-A Requiem for Erie?, 1966 DuyE W. 142; Note, The
Operation of Federalism in Diversity: Erie's Constitutional Basis, 40 IND. L.J. 512,
539-41 (1965).
39 See 1A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.304 (2d ed. 1965).
40 326 U.S. at 109.
41 See notes 9 & 21 supra and accompanying text.
42 350 U.S. 198 (1956). In Bernhardt the plaintiff brought suit in a Vermont state
court for damages resulting from his discharge under an intrastate employment contract.
The employer removed to a federal district court on diversity grounds. Taking advantage
of a broad arbitration clause in the employment contract, the plaintiff moved for a stay
of court proceedings pending arbitration under § 3 of the Arbitration Act. The Second
Circuit reversed the lower court's denial of a stay, holding that even if the contract in
question was not interstate in character, and thus not within the ambit of § 2 of the
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terms of the Act must be read in conjunction with sections 1 and 2, which
"define the field in which Congress was legislating."43 Consequently, the
statute was interpreted as not encompassing the intrastate contract involved
in that case.'4 Moreover, the Bernhardt Court -declared that arbitration
could no longer be classified as procedural, because "[it] substantially
affects the cause of action created by the State."45 Thus, the "procedural"
remedies of the Act could not be applied as an exercise of the article If
power since such an application would render the Act unconstitutional
under the Erie-Guaranty Trust doctrine by substituting a federal "outcome"
for a contrary state result upon a state cause of-action.46
After "Bernhardt circuit courts disagreed as to whether state or federal
law should govern the disposition of a diversity case involving an arbitration
agreement within a contract evidencing a transaction in interstate
commerce, and thus within the ambit of the Arbitration Act. 47 In the
leading case of Robert Lawrence Company v. Devonshire Fabrics,
Incorporated,48 the defendant sought a section 3 stay of the plaintiff's action
for fraud in the inducement of an interstate sales contract. In deciding
whether the validity of the primary contract was to be determined by the
federal court or the arbiter, the Second Circuit interpreted the arbitration
clause agreed upon by the parties in. terms of section 2 of the Act.4 9 Since
Act, § 3 of the Act nevertheless applied as procedural law of the forum. Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of America, 218 F.2d 948,951 (2d Cir. 1955).
43 350 U.S. at 201.
44 Id. at 200-01. The Court, therefore, did not need to decide whether the contract
in Bernhardt would have been excluded under the last clause in § 1 of the Arbitration
Act, which exempts from the Act "contracts of employment of -seamen, railroad em-
ployees, and any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9
U.S.C. § 1 (1964); see 350 U.S. at 201, n.3; note 23 supra. Had the Court assumed
that § 3 was singly procedural and granted the motion to stay the state cause of action,
the outcome would have been substantially different from that of the state court. Under
the applicable Vermont law, arbitration agreements were not enforceable and the ulti-
mate resolution of contractual validity would have been reached by a court and not by
an arbiter. 350 U.S. at 204-05, citing Mead v. Owen, 83 Vt. 132, 135, 74 A. 1058,
1059 (1910). See notes 22-23 & 26 supra.
41 350 U.S. at 203.
4I Id. at 202, 208 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395,411,416,420 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); cf. Note,
69 YA LJ. 847, 848 (1960).
47 Compare Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d
Cir. 1959), with Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960).
48271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), noted in 60 COLuM. L. REv. 227 (1960); 45
CORNELL L. Q. 795 (1960); 73 HAtv. L. REv. 1382 (1960); 46 IowA L. Rnv. 167
(1960); 12 STAN. L. REv. 831 (1960); 108 U. PA. L REV. 915 (1960); and 46
VA. L. REV. 340 (1960).
40 271 F.2d at 409-12. Previous Second Circuit opinions had indicated that the
illegality of a portion of a contract did not nullify an agreement to arbitrate, see, e.g.,
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that section validated only arbitration provisions, and not the entire
contract, the circuit court ruled that the arbitrators should decide the
validity of the container contract.50 As the plaintiff in Lawrence had failed
to allege fraudulent inducement of the arbitration agreement itself, a stay of
legal proceedings pending arbitration was granted.51 Furthermore, by
locating the constitutional warrant for section 2 in the commerce clause, the
Lawrence court was able to declare that section 2 and the "separability
doctrine" were controlling in all diversity cases as "national substantive
law,"52 adding by way of dictum that both were "equally applicable in
state or federal courts.'53 In this manner the Second Circuit avoided the
Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 346 U.S. 427 (1953),
and that an alleged breach of the contract did not preclude arbitration, Kulukundis
Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942). Although the
posture of New York law is unclear, apparently the courts of that state, rather than an
arbitrator, determine fraud in the inception of a contract. In view of the decision in
Prima it was unnecessary for the Court to make an actual finding as to the applicable
New York law. 388 U.S. at 400, n.3. However, in Lawrence the Second Circuit con-
cluded by way of dictum that a contrary result would have been reached had New York
law been applied rather than the federal "separability doctrine." 271 F.2d at 412; see
Wrap-Vertiser Corp. v. Plotnick, 3 N.Y.2d 17, 143 N.E.2d 366, 163 N.Y.S.2d 639
(1957). Compare Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 214
N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961), and Amerotron Corp. v. Maxwell Shapiro Woolen Co., 3 App.
Div. 2d 889, 162 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1957), affd, 4 N.Y.2d 722, 148 N.E.2d 319, 171
N.Y.S.2d 111, (1958), with Fabrex Corp. v. Winard Sales Co., 23 Misc. 2d 26, 200
N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct. 1960). But cf. Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co.,
280 F.2d 915, 923-27 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960).
" 271 F.2d at 411; see 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1964); note 22 supra. See text following
note 62 infra.
r' 271 F.2d at 413.
521d. at 409; accord, Monte v. Southern Delaware County Authority, 321 F.2d
870, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1963); Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc. v. United States, 306
F.2d 554, 558 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Moseley v. Electronic
& Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167 (1963); Standard Magnesium Corp. v. Fuchs,
251 F.2d 455, 457-58 (10th Cir. 1957). See also Brief for Respondent at 16, Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
53 271 F.2d at 407 (emphasis added). Subsequent cases in the Second Circuit have
reaffirmed the suggestion in Lawrence that the Arbitration Act and the "separability doc-
trine" were national substantive law, equally applicable in the state courts as in the
federal judiciary. See Marcy Lee Mfg. Co. v. Cortley Fabrics Co., 354 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.
1965); World Brilliance Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 342 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1965);
El Hoss Eng'r & Transp. Co. v. American Independent Oil Co., 289 F.2d 346 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961); In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1961);
Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir.); cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961); Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate &
Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960). See
also Brief for Respondent at 16 & n.*, Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395 (1967). Commentators have generally favored the "separability doctrine."
See Baum & Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in
[Vol. 1968: 588
ARBITRATION ACT
emasculation of the Act which Bernhardt seemed to require.54
Affirming defendant Flood & Conklin's motion to stay the action for
recission pending arbitration, the Prima Court first established that the
arbitration clause in question was part of a "contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce" as contemplated by sections I and 2 of the
Arbitration Act.55 Apparently, the consulting agreement, which included the
the Federal Courts (pt. 2), 8 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 428, 439 (1931); Nussbaum, The
"Separability Doctrine" in American and Foreign Arbitration, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 609
(1940); Comment, Judicial Control of the Arbitrator's Jurisdiction: A Changing Atti-
tude, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 521, 522-32 (1963); Comment, Fraudulent Inducement as a
Defense to the Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 36 YALE LJ. 866 (1927). For
a criticism of the "separability doctrine" see A. CORBIN, 6A CoNTRAcTs § 1444, at
449-50 (1962). One writer has suggested that the doctrine may be of common law
origin. See Parsell, Arbitration of Fraud in the Inducement of a Contract. 12 CORNELL
L.Q. 351, 353-54 (1927).
54 See note 46 supra and accompanying text. Viewed as substantive law, the Arbi-
tration Act would always govern an arbitration agreement in a contract involving inter-
state commerce. The Lawrence court also made clear that the federal judiciary was to
develop the Act interstitially, disclosing the "federal law." 271 F.2d at 409. See note
113 infra. The Lawrence approach neatly avoided any possible equal protection problem
reminiscent of Erie since federal law applied in all diversity cases, whether brought in
state or federal courts, and the commerce clause provided a federal right, thus removing
one of the underpinnings.of Erie-federal court treatment of a state cause of action.
See text following note 84 infra. The main objection to this position lay in the absence
of congressional intent to extend the Act to the states. See note 118 infra and accom-
panying text. Perhaps for this reason the First Circuit, in Lummus Co. v. Common-
wealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960),
refused to apply the Arbitration Act to the states in a diversity case. In Lummus the
plaintiff instituted an action in the district of Puerto Rico for rescission of a'construction
contract, and the defendant moved in a New York state court to compel arbitration. The
plaintiff removed to a New York federal district court on the basis of diversity, obtain-
ing a preliminary injunction against ,arbitration in New York. On appeal, the circuit
court applied New York law in vacating the injunction. Dismissing the:plaintiff's action
as a disguised attempt to avoid arbitration, id. at 930, the court, in dictum, eschewed
the "separability doctrine" advocated in Lawrence. Instead, the First Circuit noted that
the parties' contacts with New York would have dictated application of New York law.
Id. at 923-24.
The Lummus choice of laws approaclx may not be objectionable in terms of the
equal protection question raised by Erie, see notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text,
since, theoretically, whenever the state has a legitimate interest in the contract in dispute,
the same law would apply in both the state courts and federal courts within that state.
However, the conflicts analysis virtually nullifies the provisions of the Arbitration Act
in diversity cases because state interest in the enforcement of contracts of any type is
probably equal or superior to the federal interest in promoting arbitration. Lummus,
then, merely effectuated in a novel form the emasculation of the Act seemingly per-
mitted by Bernhardt. Thus, while Lawrence required the judiciary to indulge in what
can be reasonably described as "judicial legislation," see notes 118-20 infra and accom-
panying text, Lummus significantly limited a valid federal statute.
r 388 U.S. at 400-01; see 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1964).
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arbitration clause, did not itself encompass such a transaction. While in
addition to consultation the agreement provided for a transfer of a list of
interstate customers and a covenant not to compete, it did not embrace an
actual "transaction involving commerce" in the same manner as the original
sales contract.56 To bring the consulting provisions within the Act, the Court
noted that the agreement was designed to effectuate the transfer of
ownership and was thus an adjunct to the sales contract.57
The facts of Prima substantiate the Court's reasoning that the two
agreements were "inextricably tied," for they jointly provided for the
transfer and continued operation of the interstate paint business.58
11 388 U.S. at 401 & n. 6. See note 11 supra.
57 388 U.S. at 401. It may have been unnecessary to read the consulting agreement
into the sales contract in order to bring the arbitration clause within the § 2 prerequisite
of a "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce," 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1964),
since the lists of Flood & Conklin's interstate customers were appended to the consult-
ing agreement. But see text following note 60 infra. Yet, the consulting agreement was
primarily a personal employment contract between Prima Paint and Flood & Conklin's
chairman of the board. 388 U.S. at 397. Since Bernhardt involved an employment con-
tract held to be beyond the scope of the Arbitration Act, the Prima Court apparently
felt constrained to seek a basis other than that presented by the customer lists for bring-
ing the consulting agreement within the Act, even though Bernhardt was decided on
the basis of the intrastate character of that employment contract and thus would not
appear to present a binding precedent. See note 42 supra and text preceding note 47
supra.
The dissenters argued that the "commerce" of §2 encompassed only the interstate
transfer of physical goods between merchants. 388 U.S. at 409-10 & nn.2-3 (Black,
Douglas, Stewart, JJ., dissenting). Contra, Joint Hearings, supra note 21, at 39; Com-
mittee on Commerce, supra note 21, at 154-55, citing American Express Co. v. Iowa,
196 U.S. 133, 143 (1905). However, the only evidence set forth by the dissenters to
substantiate this limitation was (1) the fact that the sponsors of the legislation were
merchants, 388 U.S. at 409, n.2 (see representative list of sponsors of the Arbitration
Act in Brief for American Arbitration Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at Appendix, Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), and (2) the use of the
phrase "involving commerce" rather than the words "affecting commerce" which are
employed in some other commerce, clause degislation, such as the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964). 388 U.S. at 410, n.3. The legislative history of
the Arbitration Act does not reveal any congressional intention to restrict the statute
to goods between merchants. Cf. Joint Hearings, supra note 21, at 7, 16, 27-28. More-
over, § 1 of the Act defines "commerce" in strict commerce clause language: "commerce
among the several States or with foreign nations." The section would thus appear to be
an absolute invocation of the commerce power. See S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1924); 65 CONG. REc. 1931 (1924) (remarks of Representative Graham).
In addition, §1 does exclude some types of interstate contracts. See note 23 supra.
Thus, if Congress meant to limit the Act as the dissenters suggest, it would seem likely
that the section would have been made similarly explicit.
's The president of Prima Paint admitted in an affidavit that the consulting agree-
ment was "intended" for the "orderly transfer of the assets." 388 U.S. at 401, n.6. See
note 11 supra. Arguably, the short period of three weeks between the signing of the two
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Nonetheless, the Court's language may be unduly broad. Had the consulting
agreement been entered into six months instead of three weeks after the
sales contract, the former presumably would still have been made for the
purpose of promoting the company's "continuing operations. '5 9 In such a
situation, however, grafting the arbitration provision onto the initial sales
contract would arguably be an unwarranted extension of the parties'
probable intent to arbitrate only those disputes arising under the consulting
contract.60 Nevertheless, the Court's compulsion to annex the consulting
agreement to the sales contract may have revealed the outside limitations on
the scope of the act.
61
Having established the federal Act's applicability to the arbitration
provision in Prima, the majority considered whether the Act prescribed
arbitral or judicial determination of Prima's claim that the consulting
contracts suggests that the contracts were related, particularly in light of the nature of
each agreement-one provided for the transfer'of assets, and the other for the more
profitable use of those assets by the buyer. Indeed, the management experience ofFlood
& Conklin's board chairman would be of questionable value if there were no actual sale
of Flood & Conklin's facilities to Prima. However, a party may be more willing to
agree to arbitrate disputes arising out of a contract for advice and consultation than
those resulting from the transfer of a business, since the former involves a promise of
personal service and may 'not be as susceptible to satisfactory judicial enforcement as
is an executory contract for the sale of a business.
59 See 388 U.S. at 401.
60 In Prima the parties may have felt that a clash of opinion might be generated by
the consulting agreement and that arbitration should be provided as a means of amicably
resolving any differences. Moreover, the complaint only alleged fraud in the making of
the consulting agreement, which might suggest that the parties didl not intend the arbitra-
tion agreement to cover the sales contract. 388 U.S. at 398 & n.2. See note 13 supra.
Thus, it would appear that the arbitration provisions were only designed to apply to the
consulting agreement. Yet the Court omits any discussion of the parties intent as to the
scope ;of arbitration under the arbitration clause. This seems inconsistent with the
Court's treatment of contractual intent in its discussion of the "separability doctrine."
388 U.S. at 402; see note 67 infra. In presenting the elements of that doctrine, the
Prima Court agreed with the Second Circuit in Lawrence, 271 F.2d at 410-12, that ar-
bitration clauses were severable from the container contract "except where the parties
otherwise intend." 388 U.S. at 402, 406.
61See also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953); Metro Indus. Painting Corp.
v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 384 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817
(1961). The majority opinion implied that the conjunction of a multi-state customer
list, a provision for advice and consultation, and a covenant not to compete is insufficient
to satisfy the § 2 requirement that an enforceable arbitration clause be part of a con-
tract evidencing a transaction involving commerce. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1964); note 22 supra.
Conversely, the majority rejected the dissent's position that the Arbitration Act applies
only to "contracts between merchants for the interstate shipment of goods." 388 U. S. at
401 n.7, 409-10 (Black, J., dissenting); see note 57 supra. As a result the Prima Court
apparently defined a "transaction involving commerce" as an agreement which has an
immediate effect upon interstate commerce.
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agreement had been fraudulently induced.62 In resolving the same question
in Lawrence, the Second Circuit had constructed the "separability doctrine"
from the "substantive" section 2 mandate that arbitration agreements are
"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." 63 However, the Prima Court focused
upon the "procedural" language of section 4.64 Under the latter provision, a
district court is to compel arbitration once "satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in
issue ... .-"65 Specifically limiting the holding to cases "brought in a federal
court involving maritime contracts or those evidencing transactions in
'commerce,"' 66 the Supreme Court ruled that an allegation of fraud in the
inducement of the contract generally did not challenge the validity of the
arbitration agreement itself. Consequently, under section 4, validity of the
contract was to be evaluated by the arbitrator.67 Additionally, the Court
62 388 U.S. at 402-04.
6 271 F.2d at 409-I1. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
14 388 U.S. at 403-04. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
659 U.S.C. § 4 (1964) (emphasis added); 388 U.S. at 403.
6 388 U.S. at 403.
67 1d. at 403-04, 406-07. The majority did not construe the clause of § 4 which
directs a federal court to compel arbitration "in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment." 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1964). See generally W. STUJRGES, supra note 28, at 929-30.
Parties agreeing to arbitrate. a dispute arising out of the transfer of an interstate business
arguably do not anticipate the extension of their right to a judicial determination of the
validity of the sales contract itself. Since arbitration proceedings are generally designed
to capitalize on business expertise for the resolution of "technical," rather than "legal,"
controversies, 388 U.S. at 407-08; see Baum & Pressman, supra note 21, at 249-50;
Cohen & Dayton, supra note 28, at 281; Coulson, Tailoring Arbitration to Business
Needs, 19 Bus. LAWYER 1037, 1041-43, 1045, 1050 (1964); Coulson, Arbitration-
Positive Experiments in Modern Justice, 50 JuDIcATURE 125, 127 (1966), the actual
intent to arbitrate the legal question of contract validity is likely to be non-existent.
Thus, arbitration in this instance would not be "in accordance with the terms of the
agreement," since it would violate an implied understanding that questions of contractual
validity be judicially determined. Moreover, if the arbitrator subsequently decides that
the primary contract is valid, a court is presented with the anomaly of having enforced
one clause to declare the invalidity of the entire agreement. 388 U.S. at 425 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
Perhaps the strongest argument against the "separability doctrine" is the lack of
procedural safeguards for the resolution of essentially "legal" issues. Since arbitrators
are usually non-judicial officers chosen for their practical expertise, their primary efforts
are directed toward compromising the interests of the parties and not to observing the
precedential impact of previous determinations. See Comment, Judicial Review of Arbi-
tration: The Role of Public Policy, 58 Nw. U.L. RPv. 545, 547 (1963). In addition,
technical expertise would seem of limited value in adjudicating legal issues, especially
since procedural devices such as rules of evidence, burden of proof, and res judicata are
not generally incorporated into the arbitration proceedings. See Kochery, supra note 35,
at 93, n.89; cf. Nussbaum, supra note 53, at 614-15. As was stated by the dissent in
Prima: "['Jhe arbitrators the Court holds are to adjudicate the legal validity of the
contract need not even be lawyers, and in all probability will be nonlawyers, wholly
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gave implicit approval to the Lawrence dictum that federal law is to be
employed in the interpretation and construction of the arbitration agree-
ments as well as the determination of their validity.68 Hence, the view
unqualified to decide legal issues, and... not bound to do so. ... [The] Act's lan-
guage and history show that both Congress and the framers of the Act [emphasized]
... that nonlawyers designated to i ..arbitrate factual controversies arising out of
valid contracts would not trespass upon thee courts' prerogative to decide the legal ques-
tion of whether any legal contract exists upon which to base an arbitration." 388 U.S.
at 407-08 (Black, J., dissenting); Compare Cohen & Dayton, supra note 28, at 281,
with Coulson, Prima Paint: An Arbitration Milestone, 23 Bus. lAwYmE 241, 246
(1967).
One commentator maintains that the concept of severability conflicts with the
"integrated commercial transaction!' approach of the Uniform Commercial Code. Col-
lins, Arbitration and the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 Ann. J. 193, 194-95, 203-06,
213-14 (1966). But see Bernstein, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon
Arbitration: Revolutionary Overthrow or Peaceful Coexistence?, 22 ARB. J. 65 (1967).
63 The majority held that the arbitration provision involved in the present case was
easily broad enough to encompass Prima's claim of fraud. 388 U.S. at 406. Since New
York law requires the opposite conclusion, the Court must have applied federal law in
its interpretation. See note 49 supra.
Locating the separability doctrine in § 4 of the Act created textual difficulties for
the Court. Section 4 provides a remedy for the party aggrieved by a failure to arbitrate,
giving a federal court with jurisdiction the power to compel arbitration unless the
making of the arbitration agreement or the failure to comply with it are in issue. Thus,
§ 4 limits judicial consideration of contractual validity to those instances when the
legitimacy of the arbitration clause or the fact of performance under it is questioned.
Section 3, on the other hand, applies where, as in Prima, a suit has been instituted and
the defending party seeks a stay of judicial proceedings for the purpose of arbitrating.
Facially, § 3 requires that a stay be granted unless the issue in the suit was not intended
to be arbitrable under the parties' agreement. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying
text. Apparently believing that a § 3 test of intention to arbitrate would mandate judi-
cial iconsideration of all issues where fraud in the inducement of a contract is alleged
while a § 4 separability doctrine would not, the Court read the separability doctrine of
§ 4 into § 3 in order to avoid a potential race to the courthouse whenever the validity
of the entire contract is in question. 388 U.S. at 403-04. Why this circuitous route was
necessary is not apparent. Granting that § 4 mandates severable treatment of an arbi-
tration clause, this merely raises the further question whether a general allegation of
fraud in the inducement of a contract puts the making of the arbitration agreement in
issue. 388 U.S. at 410 (Black, I., dissenting). It is certainly not manifest that the latter
question requires a negative answer. It should be noted, however, that the Lawrence
court located the source of the separability doctrine in § 2 of the Act. 271 F.2d at
404-07. The Prima Court apparently grounded the doctrine in § 4 rather than in § 2
because the former is more explicit in its treatment of the arbitration clause as sever-
able from the entire contract. Nonetheless, in a footnote, the Court in Prima implied
that the separability doctrine is not inconsistent with, and encompassed by, the "savings
clause" of § 2. 388 U.S. at 404 & n.12. Arguably the separability doctrine is contrary
to the policy of the § 2 savings clause-to make arbitration agreements as enforceable,
but not more so, than any other contract. By severing the arbitration clause from the
container contract, the Court gives it a sanctity no other term of the contract has. More-
over, such treatment can hardly comport with the commercial understanding of busi-
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of the Lawrence Court that the Act creates a body of federal common law
to govern all questions surrounding arbitration appears to have been
vindicated in Prima.69
nessmen. A party induced to sign a contract containing a standard form arbitration
clause can hardly be deemed to have intended to arbitrate the purely legal question of
whether the entire contract is voidable because of fraudulent misrepresentations of sol-
vency by the other party.
Unanswered by Prima is whether state or "federal" law is to be applied in deter-
mining the validity of the principal contract whenever it is specifically alleged that the
arbitration clause was induced by fraud. The statute itself is ambiguous. Section 2 states
merely that the guarantees of the Act become inoperative when the arbitration agree-
ment is questioned "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1964) (emphasis added). See note 22 supra. Historically,
the law of contracts has developed in state courts; thus, the legal and equitable doctrines
such as failure of consideration, fraud, incapacity, and duress would seem to be appli-
cable under § 2. See Committee on Commerce, supra note 21, at 154-55; cf. Friendly,
supra note 35, at 397. However, since Prima indicates that the Act constitutes a federal
right, at least in the federal courts, see 388 U.S. at 400, 403, 405, it would seem pref-
erable, for purposes of uniformity, that the federal courts develop "federal law" in this
area as was suggested by Lawrence. See Friendly, supra at 408-21; Hill, The Law-
Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. Rnv.
1024, 1028-30, 1036-42 (1967); notes 53-54 supra & note 113 infra and accompanying
text. But cf. Poor, Arbitration Under the Federal Statute, 36 YALE L.J. 667, 671-72
1927); Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L. 595, 616-17
(1928).
Where only limited portions of a contract are arbitrable and the validity of the
entire contract is challenged, additional problems are created. A decision by an arbi-
trator is binding as to those items properly submitted to his consideration in conformity
with the arbitration agreement, unless the award is modified upon one of the statutory
grounds. See generally W. STURGEs, supra note 28, §§ 225-36, 289-307. See also note
28 supra. Presumably, however, the arbitrator's determination of contractual validity
would not be final as to those contract provisions excluded from arbitral' consideration
under the agreement. Thus, in a judicial proceeding in which a non-arbitrable provision
is subsequently challenged, a court might be presented with the possibility'of declaring
a contract invalid even though portions of it had previously been adjudged enforceable
by an arbitrator. The real difficulty arises when enforcement of an award is sought
prior to a judicial determination of the contract's validity. A party receiving an adverse
decree from an arbitrator could effectively delay enforcement by challenging the con-
tract's validity in a court proceeding, thereby subverting the goals of arbitration. See
note 21 supra.
Even where the validity of the arbitration clause is not questioned, broad arbitra-
tion agreements similar to that in Prima, see note 12 supra, give rise to interpretive
problems, since those disputes which are proper subjects for arbitration under a broad
agreement have not yet been determined. One federal court has held that an antitrust
claim may be arbitrated under such a clause. American Safety Equip. Corp. v. Hickok
Mfg. Co., 271 F. Supp. 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see Farber, The Antitrust Claimant
and Compulsory Arbitration Clauses, 28 FED. BAR J. 90 (1968). On appeal, however,
the Second Circuit reversed, citing the important public interest in antitrust litigation,
and remanded for arbitration of those issues not involving antitrust claims. American
Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., -. F.2d - (2d Cir. 1968).
69 See note 54 supra.
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Untreated by the Court, however, are several constitutional issues raised
by the separability doctrine. Since the size of an arbitrator's fee may depend
upon the length of his deliberations, as urged by Mr. Justice Black in his
dissent,70 it is in an arbitrator's own interest to refuse to find fraud in the
making of the arbitration agreement, or in the making of the principal
contract, in order to retain jurisdiciton. 71 Decisions by an official who has a
"direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" in the outcome of a
proceeding have been overturned by the Supreme Court as a deprivation of
the litigant's right to due process.72 Arguably, such a rationale would
emcompass an arbitrator's interest in an arbitration proceeding since a
determination of contract validity seems to promote his pecuniary
advantage.73 The extent of the arbitrator's remuneration, however, is
necessarily contingent upon the existence of a continued controversy, or
future controversies, between the parties who sought the arbiter's services,
and a decision in favor of contract validity may induce the losing party to
settle voluntarily without further arbitration. Thus, the arbiter's interest is
not as certain as that of a magistrate who is entitled to a percentage of each
fine assessed. In fact, in the majority of instances the arbitrator receives no
'o 388 U.S. at 416 (Black, J., dissenting).
71 In those instances in which a commercial arbitrator is compensated, fees are
computed on a per diem basis-$100 per day being the rate suggested by the American
Arbitration Association. The Association maintains, however, that the arbitrator is
compensated in less than 10% of non-labor arbitration cases. Coulson, Prima Paint: An
Arbitration Milestone, 23 Bus. LAWYER 241, 246 (1967). Several states set arbitral fees
by statute. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 679.17 (1950) ($2 per diem); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 5-213 (1964) ($1 per diem); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 129 (1963) ($35
per diem); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 23-516 (1955) ($5 per diem).
72 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927), noted in 40 HAnv. L. REv. 1149
(1927), 1 U. Cru. L. REv. 338 (1927), 13 VA. L. Rnv. 584 (1927) and 36 YALE LJ.
1171 (1927). Tumey involved a conviction for unlawful possession of liquor. Under
state law, money received in payment of a fine was to be divided equally between the
state and township treasuries. In the municipality in question, the township's share was
to be used to finance enforcement of the liquor law and to compensate the mayor for
hearing 'cases involving infractions of that law. The Supreme Court overturned the
conviction rendered by the mayor, reasoning that the latter's pecuniary interest in the
outcome violated the defendant's right to due process of law. 273 U.S. at 523, 533, 535;
accord, United States v. O'Connor, 291 F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1961) (receiver ap-
pointed as special master); Stockwell v. Township Bd., 22 Mich. 341 (1871). But see
Bevan v. Krieger, 289 U.S. 459 (1933) (compensation too remote and judgment sub-
ject to de novo judicial review); Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928) (mayor on fixed
salary). A most literal application of the Tumey doctrine is demonstrated by Pearce v.
Atwood, 13 Mass. 324 (1816), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Court disallowed
an arrest warrant issued by a magistrate because the magistrate was an inhabitant of
the town which was to receive any fine assessed under the particular offense -charged.
Said the court: "Any interest .... however small, has been held sufficient to render
a judge incompetent." Id. at 340.
Is See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
Vol. 1968: 5881
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
compensation regardless of the length of his deliberations v4 Moreover, the
Arbitration Act provisions allowing judicial reversal of an award for fraud
or corruption mitigate the possibility of arbitral bias,75 although the
judiciary has historically been reluctant to reverse the findings of an
arbitrator. 6 Further, partiality and fraud, while matters of evidence, are
difficult of proof.77 Thus, in those instances in which an arbitral fee is
affected by a preliminary finding by an arbitrator as to the validity of a
contract, a more extensive judicial inquiry into the actual arbitration
proceedings would seem desirable whenever review is sought.g
The format attendant arbitration, in combination with the separability
doctrine, presents an additional constitutional complication. The seventh
amendment extends the right to jury trial to all suits at common law. Since
fraud in the inducement of a contract was actionable at common law,79 the
parties in Prima would normally be entitled to a jury trial of Prima's action
for rescission under the dictates of the seventh amendment.80 Arbitration
does not qualify as a jury trial since it is a non-judicial proceeding
conducted by a selected individual or individuals, and not a trial before a
panel of randomly chosen peers.81 Consequently, unless it can be said -that
the right -to jury trial had been waived,82 the Prima decision would seem to
deny the seventh amendment guarantee by submitting the question of the
validity of the consulting agreement to an arbitrator. If entered into
willingly and with full knowledge of its ramifications, the arbitration
agreement could be viewed as such a waiver.8 3 As a practical matter,
however, parties to an arbitration contract are not likely to anticipate the
need for either an arbitral or judicial determination of contractual validity,
74 Id.
75See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1964); note 28 supra and accompanying text.
76 W. STURGFS, COMMERCIAL ARBRATIoNS AND AwARDs § 235, at 613 & n.259
(1930); see Glick, Bias, Fraud, Misconduct and Partiality of the Arbitrator, 22 Ann.
J. 161 (1967); Comment, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Role of Public Policy,
58 Nw. U.L. R v. 545, 546 (1963). See also Poor, supra note 68, at 674-76.
77 See W. STUoEs, supra note 76, §§ 364-67.
78The Arbitration Act provides for judicial review of an arbitral award in the
federal district court for the district in which the award was made. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11
(1964). Review may be requested by either party to the award within the confines set
forth in §§ 10-11 of the Act. See note 28 supra. One writer has suggested that the Uni-
form Commercial Code provides a greater opportunity for state court review of an
arbitrator's award than do the various state arbitration statutes. Collins, supra note 67,
at 211-14.79E.g., Lang v. Giraudo, 311 Mass. 132, 40 N.E.2d 707 (1942); American Laun-
dry Mach. Co. v. Skinner, 225 N.C. 285,34 S.E.2d 190 (1945).
80 388 U.S. at 412-15 (Black, L, dissenting).
81 See note 67 supra.
82 388 U.S. at 413-14 & n.1O (Black, J., dissenting).




and the contract would not be an expression of their intent on this matter.
To find a valid waiver, therefore, evidence of an affirmative disclaimer
would appear indispensable. For this reason, the separability doctrine, at
least as applied retrospectively to the parties in Prima, would seem a harsh
procedure. Yet, by requiring the parties to enumerate specifically those
issues in the contract which are to be juridically considered in order to
overcome the presumption of arbitral jurisdiction, the Prima Court is giv-
ing effect to the congressional policy in favor of arbitration.8 4
In order to apply the Arbitration Act and the separability doctrine to the
facts in Prima, the Supreme Court had to determine whether, as Bernhardt
intimated, state law was controlling by virtue of Erie and Guaranty Trust.8 5
Contending that Prima was not a "simple" diversity case, the majority
expressly denied that either the substantive-procedural dualism of Erie or
the "outcome-determinative" test of Guaranty Trust were relevant. Instead,
the Court viewed the issue to be "whether Congress may prescribe how
federal courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject matter over
which Congress plainly has power to legislate. '8 6 So framed, the question
dictated an affirmative answer. The Court completed its analysis by
declaring the Act to be a legitimate exercise of the federal commerce power,
regulating federal court treatment of a federal claim.8 7
In its establishment of the substantive rules of the Act as giving rise to a
federal right, Prima is entirely consistent with Bernhardt, for the latter
questioned the Arbitration Act's constitutionality in terms of federal court
treatment of a state-created right and did not rule upon the Act's
constitutional antecedents.88 However, by speaking only of federal court
enforcement of the Act and the separability doctrine,89 the Supreme Court
may have exposed the Act to an equal protection attack90 by a party not
84 388 U.S. at 406. See notes 106-13 infra and accompanying text.
8 See text accompanying notes 33-41 supra & notes 3-4 supra.
8 388 U.S. at 405.
8 Id. at 405-06. While evidence of congressional reliance upon the commerce clause
as the basis for the Act is not as substantial as the Prima opinion would indicate, the
wording of §§ 1 and 2 tends to support the commerce clause antecedent. See notes 24
& 32 supra and accompanying text.
83 See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
89 388 U.S. at 403-06.
0 See id. at 424-25 (Black, J., dissenting). The factual situation of Prima does not
present the equal protection objection in its clearest form, for the Court did not have
to deal with a state court's refusal to apply the Arbitration Act to an interstate arbitra-
tion agreement. Since Prima's action for recision was brought in a federal district court
on diversity grounds, the Court did not have to consider the propriety of state court
adherence to the Act. For this reason, one may read the Court's refusal to adopt the
Lawrence rationale that the mandate of § 2 is binding upon the states as a conscious
attempt to limit Prima to its facts. However, the majority's statement that Prima was
not a "simple diversity case," id. at 405, arguably suggests that the Court viewed the
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able to gain access to the federal courts for enforcement of the Act's
substantive rules. Not only would removal be unavailable to a resident
defendant,9 1 but also original federal actions are subject to the dual
jurisdictional requirements set forth in the procedural sections of the Act.92
Section 4, for example, states that a party seeking enforcement of an
arbitration agreement "may petition any United States District Court,
which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction .... '93 Recourse
to the federal courts, therefore, is contingent upon the existence of both an
arbitration agreement in a contract involving interstate commerce and
separate federal question or diversity jurisdictional grounds.94 If the Ar-
bitration Act applies only in the federal courts, this double jurisdictional
requirement, together with the limitations of the federal removal statute,
subjects a resident of a state hostile to arbitration to differing state and
federal court treatment of a contract within the purview of the Act. For
example, if a claim of fraudulent inducement is brought in a state court, the
state court would adjudicate, administering state contract law. The same
claim brought in the local federal court would, as a consequence of the
"separability doctrine," be determined by an arbiter in compliance with the
arbitration agreement. Hence, where a resident is sued in a local state court,
case as without the scope of Erie, and thus saw no need to extend the Act to the states
in order to sustain its constitutionality. Yet, in denying the applicability of the Erie-
Guaranty Trust doctrine because the Act provides a federal cause of action, id. at
404-05, the majority has not dealt with the rationale of Erie that concurrent state and
federal court jurisdiction should not give rise to "forum-shopping" and "unconstitutional
discrimination." Id. at 424-25 (Black, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 88
supra & 106 infra.
0128 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964). Since the Arbitration Act itself does not grant the
federal district courts original jurisdiction, see note 26 supra and text accompanying
notes 29 supra & 92-4 infra, or federal question jurisdiction, see note 96 infra and ac-
companying text, an action based upon the Act will be removable "only if none of the
parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964).
92See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-13 (1964). See note 26 supra and text accompanying note 29
supra.
93 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1964) (emphasis added). See note 26 supra. The other procedural
sections also assume federal .jurisdiction acquired independent of the Act itself. See 9
U.S.C. §§ 3, 5-13 (1964); cf. note 94 infra.
4 It seems clear that the Act itself does not furnish federal question jurisdiction.
The Lawrence court reached this conclusion, 271 F.2d at 408-09, as did the dissent in
Prima, 388 U.S. at 420 & n.24 (Black, J., dissenting). The courts and commentators
are in general agreement with this proposition. See, e.g., Mengel Co. v. Nashville Paper
Prods. & Spec. Workers Union, 221 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1955); Krauss Bros. Lum-
ber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, 62 F.2d 1004, 1006 (2d Cir. 1933); Sturges & Murphy,
Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration




and cannot remove, he is prevented from resorting to the otherwise
available federal remedy of the Act. Even if the substantive provisions of
the Act were invoked to establish a concurrent original federal action, the
federal anti-injunction statute would presumably prevent the resident
defendant from successfully enjoining the state court proceeding. 95 While
the defendant might obtain a section 4 compulsion order in a federal
court,96 enforcement of the resultant award would be precluded if the state
court reached a judgment in the interim. 97 In numerous instances then, due
to the dual jurisdictional requirements of the Act, the general removal
statute, and the fact that the Act itself does not provide for separate federal
question jurisdiction, a party may be forced to accept differing state and
federal court treatment of a single cause of action.98
15 "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in
a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1964). The Arbitration Act does not grant the federal courts power to stay state court
proceedings. Similarly, in enjoining'a state proceeding in order to compel arbitration
under § 4 of the Act, a federal court would not be acting to protect or effectuate a
judgment. Thus, the only one of the three conditions iq § 2283 which might apply in
this instance would be an attempt by a federal court to protect its jurisdiction. More-
over, since the statute is designed to prevent conflict between federal and state courts,
see Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 225 (1957); Henson v. Hoth,
258 F. Supp. 33, 34-35 (D. Colo. 1966), it is generally maintained that the Act should
be construed narrowly, see Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 587-93 (4th Cir.
1964); T. Smith & Son v. Williams, 275 F.2d 397, 402-07 (5th Cir. 1960). It is
doubtful that the interestin comity would be outweighed by the interest in arbitration,
particularly in light of the state interest in contracts generally. See text following note
104 infra. Thus, the third condition would also appear inapplicable. But see Fremont
Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., 86 F. Supp. 968 (D. Neb. 1949) (dictum), aft'd,
183 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1956i). The district court in Fremont reserved decision on this
question, but the court of appeals intimated that, even if the plaintiff had been entitled
on the merits to specific performance of an arbitration agreement, the federal court
was without power to provide this remedy once a state court action had been com-
menced. Id. at 60.
90 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1964). See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
9 Cf. Schonwald, Problems of Finality and Consistency in Commercial Arbitration
Awards: The Role of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel, 22 Alm. J. 129, 136-37
(1967).
08 A ready solution to the equal protection dilemma posed by Prima would be to
allow removal to the federal courts .regardless of the citizenship of the parties. Such
a result would be achieved under alternatives offered in recent re-examinations of fed-
eral jurisdiction. Commenting on an American Law Institute study (ALI Study of the
Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, Official Draft No. 3, 1965),
Professor Wright stated that the drafters felt that there was a need for uniformity as to
federal questions, and, therefore, a defendant ought to be permitted to gain entrance
to a federal court if he has a "federal defense." Wright, Federal Question Jurisdiction,
17 S.C.L. REv. 660, 664-65 (1965). See also Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
331, 354 (1855); Tim FEDERAuST No. 80, at 502 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
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Prima differs from Erie since a federal statute, rather than a judicial rule,
was the alleged source of discrimination and a federal remedy, not a state
right was drawn into question. Consequently, in order to prevail on equal
protection grounds, the resident must demonstrate that the Arbitration Act
establishes an arbitrary classification of persons benefitted by the proffered
remedy and that the classification is not reasonably related to the purpose of
the statute.99 Section 2 of the Arbitration Act purports to validate written
agreements to arbitrate contained in any contract involving interstate
commerce. 100 Yet, by failing to provide that the Act itself would sustain
federal jurisdiction, it is arguable that Congress arbitrarily discriminated
against those parties whose contract affected interstate commerce but who
lacked the Act's dual jurisdictional prerequisites.101 There would seem to be
no rational basis for excluding arbitration agreements entered into by such
persons since, presumably, these contracts would not be substantively
distinguishable from agreements made by parties enjoying free access to the
federal courts. Since Congress had the power to preempt the field of
interstate contracts by virtue of the commerce clause, 102 and enacted
A similar analysis has been offered by Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision
of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 233-34 (1948): "[It is] ...
far more logical [to grant] .,,. removal to defendants when they claim a federal defense
against the plaintiff's state-created claim and to the plaintiff when . . . he relies by
way of replication on assertion of a federal right. The need is to remember that the
reason for providing the initial federal forum is the fear that state courts will view the
federal right ungenerously." Id. (emphasis added). Logically then, while the Arbitration
Act does not constitute a federal question, see note 94 supra, the Act could come with-
in the terminology of a "federal defense" where utilized by a party to defend against a
state cause of action. But see IA J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRA cnc 0.157[1.-3], at 75
(removal statutes are strictly construed by the courts). Of course, the simplest solution
to the problem posed by Prima would be for Congress to specify that if a state chooses
to accept litigation concerned with arbitration of contracts affecting interstate commerce,
it must adopt §§ 1 and 2 as governing rules. Yet, there is no indication that congres-
sional review of the Act is anticipated.
1 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (classification must
be "reasonable in light of [the statute's] purpose"); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
500 (1954) (classification reasonably related to a "proper governmental objective");
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) ("reasonable classification implies action con-
sistent with the legitimate interests of the State").
1- 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
101But cf. Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945): "In giving federal
courts 'cognizance' of equity suits in cases of diversity jurisdiction, Congress never gave,
nor did the federal courts ever claim, -the power to deny substantive rights created by
State law or to create substantive rights denied by State law.
'This does not mean that whatever equitable remedy is available in a State court
must be available in a diversity suit in a federal court, or conversely, that a federal
court may not afford an equitable remedy not available in a State court."
102 See Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, The United States
Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A.J. 153, 155 (1925).
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language which seemingly would support enforcement of all arbitration
provisions contained in interstate contracts, a judicial resolution which
would leave some agreements at the mercy of contrary state law appears to
be an unresponsive attempt to effectuate the policy of the Act. Arguably,
however, such limitation on the scope of the Act can be rationalized as an
accommodation of the significant state interest in the enforceability of
contracts generally. There are indications in the legislative history of the
Arbitration Act that Congress did not wish to "bludgeon" the states into
adopting arbitration enforcement.103 Also, it seems arguable that Congress
wished to lead by example in this field, hoping the states would enact
similar legislation. 104 Indeed the Act, by leaving the states free of federal
domination in an area of legitimate state concern, may be viewed as an
attempted promotion of creative federalism. 05 Thus, if unequal protection
occurs, it results from the nature of federalism, and not from an
over-inclusive or an under-inclusive classification of persons afforded a
remedy under an act of Congress. Even if the equal protection issue is
avoidable, however, a significant "forum-shopping" problem remains as
long as the Act is held applicable solely in the federal courts. The
forum-shopping problem, together with the desirability of vindicating the
policy of the Arbitration Act, argues in favor of applying the Act to the
states in the manner of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.0 6 Yet, the
history underlying the passage of the Arbitration Act is not comparable to
the labor unrest which prompted the federal labor laws, and the national
policy in favor of arbitration may not appear to be as compelling as that
supporting effective collective bargaining. 10 7 However, the majority opinion
in Prima seems to lay the foundation for the refutation of this policy
distinction. Except in those instances where the "making" of the arbitration
provision itself is in issue, the doctrine of separability enunciated in Prima
mandates the enforcement of broad arbitration provisions. By holding that
Congress, through section 4 of the Act, explicitly directed the federal courts
to apply this expansive doctrine in order to vindicate "the unmistakably
clear congressional purpose that arbitration procedure ... be speedy and
103 See 388 U.S. at 420 & n.23 (Black, J., dissenting); Joint Hearings Before the
Subcomm. of the Comms. on the Judiciary on the Arbitration of Interstate Commercial
Disputes, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, vol. 1, at 28, 39-40 (1924).
104 id.
105 See 388 U.S. at 405-06 n.13; notes 9 & 28 supra. But see note 21 supra.
Since §§ 3 and 4 of the Arbitration Act provide equitable remedies, Congress may
also have hesitated to extend the Act to the states out of deference to the historical lack
of equity powers in various state jurisdictions. Cf. 1-2 J. MooRa, FEDERAL PAcrcnE
0.6[2.-2J, at 216; 2.03, at 314-15; 2.09, at 440,455-56 (1964).
'0L Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1964).




not subject to delay -and obstruction in the courts,"1 08 the Prima court has,
in effect, determined that the congressionally expressed national policy in
favor of arbitration is very strong indeed. Further, the danger of disparate
state and federal court treatment of a federal remedy is presently as
immediate in the arbitration context as that confronting the Supreme Court
in its interpretation of section 301.109 The Arbitration Act is perhaps more
readily interpreted as applicable to the states than is section 301 since the
latter provides only for the bringing of a suit in a federal court when there
has been a violation of a labor contract.110 Section 2 of the Arbitration Act,
on the other hand, states in substantive terms that all agreements covered
by the Act are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," and is not framed
simply in terms of providing access to the federal courts."' In addition,
Prima's endorsement of the Act as "national substantive law" would appear
to be analogous to Supreme Court rulings in Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills1 2 and its progeny that section 301 of Taft-Hartley is "federal
law," binding on the states.113
Textually, the Arbitration Act lends itself to a bifurcated construction
which would permit an extension of the Act to the states. Sections 1 and 2
do not refer to any particular court for the validation of contracts "involving
commerce," -and may be distinguished from the procedural portions which
are addressed to the federal courts alone. Language in Bernhardt that the
108 388 U.S. at 403-04.
109 See Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-04 (1962)
(state courts must apply federal law in suits under § 301); Comment, Development of
the Scope of Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 49 CORNELL L.Q.
81, 83-84 (1963).
110Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1964). Section 301 (a) states, in part: "Suits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in con-
troversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." See note 22 supra.
'See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1964). See also note 22 supra and preceding text.
112353 U.S. 448 (1957).
-'Id. at 456; see, e.g., Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95
(1962); Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283 (1959). There are additional
examples of judge-made 'federal law," which appear to contradict the pronouncement
in Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, that there is no federal common law. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (government commercial paper); Sola Elec.
Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (anti-trust); Hinderlider v. La Plata
River Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (apportionment of water in interstate streams);
Dwinell-Wright Co. v. National Fruit Prod. Co., 140 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1944) (trade-
mark infringement); cf. Comment, Hanna v. Plummer: An Expanded Concept of Fed-
eral Common Law-A Requiem for Erie?, 1966 Durn LJ. 142, 147. See generally
2 W. CRossKEY, POLITICS Am THE CONSTrrTUTION 912-20 (1953); Clark, State Law
in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J.
267 (1946); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 383 (1964); Hill, supra note 68.
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sections of the Act are to be read as "integral parts of a whole' 4 would not
prevent such a dissection, if it is noted that Bernhardt read section 3 in
terms of section 2 to determine the applicability of the former section. The
scope of section 2 was not determined by the procedural remedies of section
3.115 Similarly, the Prima Court gauged -the appositeness of sections 3 and 4
by the scope of section 2, and not vice versa.116 Therefore, sections 1 and 2
could be freely and entirely applied to the states.117
Reading the Arbitration Act in this disjunctive manner would
undoubtedly be violative of the legislative scheme. It seems clear that the
Act was intended to correct judicial antipathy toward arbitration in fed-
eral rather than state courts.118 Indeed, all of the procedural clauses of
the Act are addressed solely to the federal courts, and state court pro-
ceedings are not mentioned in the entire Act. Arguably, some distortion
of original legislative intent is justified. Because of the intervention of Erie,
the resultant emasculating implications of Bernhardt, and the failure of the
states to pass uniform laws on arbitration to supplement the Act, the
statutory plan to make all antecedent arbitration agreements valid has not
been realized. 119 In addition, subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court
expanding the breadth of the commerce clause seriously weaken any need
for an appeal to federalism, since the present desire is to have federal
uniformity in most matters significantly affecting interstate commerce.120
n4 350 U.S. at 201.
115 Id. at 201-02.116 See 388 U.S. at 401,403-04.
'-' See 108 U. PA. L Ray. 915, 920-21 & n. 37 (1960). It has been observed that
the problems implicit in leaving to the.federal courts the task of formulating "arbitra-
tion law" are not as severe as those assumed by the courts under the Lincoln Mills de-
cision. See 73 HIv. L. REv. 1382, 1385 (1960).
Assuming the substantive rights of § 2 are applicable to 'the states, the question
remains whether the remedial sections of the Act must also be applied by the state
courts. See generally Note, Scope of the United States Arbitration Act in Commercial
Arbitration: Problems in Federalism, 58 Nw. U.L. Rav. 468, 492-93 (1963).
I's Joint Hearings, supra note 103, at 16-17, 37; HR. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1924); Baum & Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration
Agreements in the Federal Courts (pt.2), 8 N.Y.U.L.Q. 428, 459 (1931); Committee
on Commerce, supra note 102, at 154; 73 Hsnv. L. REV. 1382, 1383 (1960); 108
U. PA. L. Rav. 915 (1960); Note, 69 YALE LI. 847, 863 & n.100 (1960); note 32
supra; cf. Bernheimer, The United States Arbitration Act, 3 DOCKET 2928 (1925).
119 See Joint Hearings, supra note 103, at 16, 28 (statements of Mr. Cohen and
Mr. Rose); Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595,
616-17 (1928). Contra, Joint Hearings, supra note 103, at 39-40 (statement of Mr.
Cohen).
I See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filbum,
317 U.S. 111 (1942). See also note 32 supra. The Arbitration Act clearly applies to
arbitration agreements contained-.in contracts involving commerce with foreigd nations.
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1964). In contracts between American and foreign corporations
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Thus, to avoid the forum-shopping difficulty and strengthen the significant
national policy in favor of arbitration, the Supreme Court may extend at
least sections 1 and 2 to the states.
there will very likely be at least diversity jurisdiction, and, therefore, there would be no
difficulty in gaining access to the federal courts. Thus, Prima will likely have a signifi-
cant impact on all international arbitration agreements involving American corporations,
resulting in uniform enforcement of such agreements in the federal courts. See Com-
ment, A New Approach to United States Enforcement of International Arbitration
Awards, 1968 DUKE L.J 258, 279 n.106. The statement of a 1925 commentator on
the Act would now appear to be accurate: "[T]he statute . ..affects all agreements
containing an arbitration clause made by residents of Britain or of the Continent of
Europe which in any way relate to the'manufacture, sale or delivery of merchandise
within the United States.. . ." Gordon, International Aspects of Trade Arbitration, 11
A.B.A.J. 717 (1925). Moreover, the Prima decision, even without additional legislation,
would appear to permit greater American participation in several existing bilateral com-
mercial treaties, and, perhaps, in recent international arbitration conventions. See Report
of the Comm. on Int'l Unification of Private Law, 1960 A.B.A. PRocEEDINGs (Int'l
& Comp. L. Section) 202-07, 210, 217-33; Delaume, Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 1966 A.B.A. INT'L
LAWYER 64.
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